Embracing the Enemy

\'Alvaro Delgado-Vega and Johannes Schneider

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Abstract: We study the repeated interactions between two power-hungry agents, the "friend", and the "enemy," and one power broker, the principal. All three care about the leading agent's policy choice. The principal, who aligns more with the friend, can influence but not fully control leadership allocation. After an initial cordon sanitaire breaks, the principal embraces the enemy, sometimes promising persistent support: she grants the enemy power in exchange for moderation, which benefits the friend who reciprocates. The closer the principal is to the friend, the more she desires to embrace the enemy, but the harder it is to uphold such promises.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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