Persuasion and Optimal Stopping

Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo and Weijie Zhong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide a unified analysis of how dynamic information should be designed in optimal stopping problems: a principal controls the flow of information about a payoff relevant state to persuade an agent to stop at the right time, in the right state, and choose the right action. We further show that for arbitrary preferences, intertemporal commitment is unnecessary: optimal dynamic information designs can always be made dynamically consistent.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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