Redistribution Through Market Segmentation

Victor Augias, Alexis Ghersengorin and Daniel M. A. Barreto

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consumer data can be used to sort consumers into different market segments, allowing a monopolist to charge different prices at each segment. We study consumer-optimal segmentations with redistributive concerns, i.e., that prioritize poorer consumers. Such segmentations are efficient but may grant additional profits to the monopolist, compared to consumer-optimal segmentations with no redistributive concerns. We characterize the markets for which this is the case and provide a procedure for constructing optimal segmentations given a strong redistributive motive. For the remaining markets, we show that the optimal segmentation is surprisingly simple: it generates one segment with a discount price and one segment with the same price that would be charged if there were no segmentation. We also show that a regulator willing to implement the redistributive-optimal segmentation does not need to observe precisely the composition and the frequency of each market segment, the aggregate distribution over prices suffices.

Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-ind and nep-mic
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