Redistribution Through Market Segmentation

Victor Augias, Alexis Ghersengorin and Daniel M. A. Barreto

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., richer consumers pay higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may not maximize consumer surplus, instead granting extra profits to the monopolist. We further show that optimal redistributive segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.14174 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2406.14174

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().