Guaranteed shares of benefits and costs

Anna Bogomolnaia and Herv\'e Moulin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A context-free problem of Fair Division is a function W from a profile of n types to a freely transferable amount of surplus W(x) they must share in the common property regime. A pair of tight guarantees assigns to each type an upper and a lower bound on its share under any profile of types of the other agents, and these bounds cannot be improved. The choice of a particular pair of such guarantees when the types and W have an economic interpretation vindicates ony some familiar fair sharing rules, and suggests many new ones. Our examples include the allocation of an indivisible good or bad, the classic model of a commons where types enter additively in the function W, and sharing the cost of a capacity or of the transportation costs to a location on a line.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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