Fiduciary Duty in the Municipal Bonds Market

Baridhi Malakar (bmalakar3@gatech.edu)

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I examine whether the imposition of fiduciary duty on municipal advisors affects bond yields and advising fees. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, I show that bond yields reduce by $\sim$9\% after the imposition of the SEC Municipal Advisor Rule due to lower underwriting spreads. Larger municipalities are more likely to recruit advisors after the rule is effective and experience a greater reduction in yields. However, smaller issuers do not experience a reduction in offering yields after the SEC Rule. Instead, their borrowing cost increases if their primary advisor exits the market. Using novel hand-collected data, I find that the average advising fees paid by issuers does not increase after the regulation. Overall, my results suggest that while fiduciary duty may mitigate the principal-agent problem between some issuers and advisors, there is heterogeneity among issuers.

Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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