Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design

Eric Yan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We show the existence of mechanism design settings where the planner has an interest in agents receiving noisy signals about the types of other agents. When the planner is interested only in partial implementation, any social choice rule that is incentive-compatible after agents receive additional information about other agents is incentive-compatible without this information. However, additional information about other agents can eliminate undesired equilibria, making it helpful to a planner interested in full implementation. We provide a sufficient condition under which a social choice rule that is not fully implementable when agents have no information about types of other agents can become fully implementable if agents have additional information.

Date: 2024-05, Revised 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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