Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders

Zhuo Chen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Patients often avoid medical tests because testing produces not only useful information but also painful beliefs. This paper studies optimal communication between a doctor and an information-avoidant patient who first decides whether to take a test and, after an unfavorable result, whether to accept treatment. The doctor can disclose information about how severe non-treatment would be if the patient is sick. The main tension is between warning and reassurance. A warning can make treatment compelling after diagnosis, but reassurance can make testing acceptable by preserving hope about the untreated prospect. I characterize the optimal policy. When the warning that supports treatment is compatible with testing, the doctor uses warning-in-advance. When such warning would deter testing, the doctor constructs an information greenhouse: a committed post-test information environment that reassures the patient about the untreated prospect. With voluntary consultation, reassurance must sometimes be moved before the test as precautionary comfort.

Date: 2024-07, Revised 2026-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.02948 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2407.02948

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().