EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Testing by Betting while Borrowing and Bargaining

Hongjian Wang, Muriel F. P\'erez-Ortiz, Wouter M. Koolen and Aaditya Ramdas

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Testing by betting has been a cornerstone of the game-theoretic statistics literature. One bets against the null hypothesis, and the accumulated wealth $W_t$ quantifies the evidence against the null hypothesis after $t$ rounds, and the null can be rejected at level $\alpha$ whenever $W_t \geq 1/\alpha$. A key assumption permeating the literature is that one cannot bet more money than they currently have (the wealth must stay nonnegative). In this work, we examine the consequences of allowing the bettor to borrow money in each round (for example after going bankrupt). Specifically, we ask how the threshold of $1/\alpha$ must be accordingly adjusted to retain the desired level $\alpha$. Our findings are twofold. First, if the new rejection rule is $W_t \geq g(\alpha,L_t)$ where $L_t$ is the total liability at time $t$, then we show that $g(\alpha,0)>1/\alpha$ if $g(\alpha,L_t) 0$; in words, we must pay for the possibility of borrowing, even if in fact we do not borrow. Second, and in contrast to the first, if one employs a path dependent threshold $h(\alpha,W_0,L_1,\dots,W_{t-1},L_t)$, that is a function of past leverage ratios, then there is in fact no extra price to pay for the possibility of borrowing.

Date: 2024-07, Revised 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.11465 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2407.11465

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2026-05-05
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.11465