Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance

Patrick Allmis

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.

Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.14045 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2407.14045

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().