Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms

Di Feng and Jacob Coreno

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.

Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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