Similarity of Information and Collective Action

Deepal Basak, Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight.

Date: 2024-07, Revised 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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