Diversity in Choice as Majorization

Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen and M. Bumin Yenmez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We use majorization to model comparative diversity in school choice. A population of agents is more diverse than another population of agents if its distribution over groups is less concentrated: being less concentrated takes a specific mathematical meaning borrowed from the theory of majorization. We adapt the standard notion of majorization in order to favor arbitrary distributional objectives, such as population-level distributions over race/ethnicity or socioeconomic status. With school admissions in mind, we axiomatically characterize choice rules that are consistent with modified majorization, and constitute a principled method for admitting a diverse population of students into a school. Two important advantages of our approach is that majorization provides a natural notion of diversity, and that our axioms are independent of any exogenous priority ordering. We compare our choice rule to the leading proposal in the literature, ``reserves and quotas,'' and find ours to be more flexible.

Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-ure
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