Getting the Agent to Wait

Maryam Saeedi, Yikang Shen and Ali Shourideh

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We examine the strategic interaction between an expert (principal) maximizing engagement and an agent seeking swift information. Our analysis reveals: When priors align, relative patience determines optimal disclosure -- impatient agents induce gradual revelation, while impatient principals cause delayed, abrupt revelation. When priors disagree, catering to the bias often emerges, with the principal initially providing signals aligned with the agent's bias. With private agent beliefs, we observe two phases: one engaging both agents, followed by catering to one type. Comparing personalized and non-personalized strategies, we find faster information revelation in the non-personalized case, but higher quality information in the personalized case.

Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2407.19127

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