A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P Gilles and Lina Mallozzi

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Abstract: In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $\lambda$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.

Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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