Games with Planned Actions and Scouting

Wolfgang Kuhle

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they receive on their adversary's preparations. In turn, we examine how players' information over each others' planned actions influences winning odds in matching pennies games, and how it incentivises the use of decoys, deception, and camouflage. Across scenarios, we emphasize that the decomposition of an action into (i) a preparation to act and (ii) the execution of the action, allows to analyze one-shot simultaneous-move games, where players partially observe each others' contemporaneous actions.

Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-spo
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