A Theory of Recommendations

Jean-Michel Benkert and Armin Schmutzler

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper investigates the value of recommendations for disseminating economic information, with a focus on frictions resulting from preference heterogeneity. We consider Bayesian expected-payoff maximizers who receive non-strategic recommendations by other consumers. The paper provides conditions under which different consumer types accept these recommendations. Moreover, we assess the overall value of a recommendation system and the determinants of that value. Our analysis highlights the importance of disentangling objective information from subjective preferences when designing value-maximizing recommendation systems.

Date: 2024-08, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11362 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Recommendations (2024)
Working Paper: A theory of recommendations (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2408.11362

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