Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification

Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner

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Abstract: A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents, where $k

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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