Uniform price auction with quantity constraints

Kiho Yoon

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds a Nash equilibrium outcome under semi-complete information as well as a novel ascending auction under incomplete information that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is sometimes advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.04047 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2409.04047

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().