Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Mass\'o and Alejandro Neme

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.

Date: 2024-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.05315 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2409.05315

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().