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Information Asymmetry Index: The View of Market Analysts

Roberto Frota Decourt, Heitor Almeida, Philippe Protin and Matheus R. C. Gonzalez
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Roberto Frota Decourt: UNISINOS
Heitor Almeida: UIUC
Philippe Protin: UGA INP IAE
Matheus R. C. Gonzalez: UNISINOS

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The purpose of the research was to build an index of informational asymmetry with market and firm proxies that reflect the analysts' perception of the level of informational asymmetry of companies. The proposed method consists of the construction of an algorithm based on the Elo rating and captures the perception of the analyst that choose, between two firms, the one they consider to have better information. After we have the informational asymmetry index, we run a regression model with our rating as dependent variable and proxies used by the literature as the independent variable to have a model that can be used for other researches that need to measure the level of informational asymmetry of a company. Our model presented a good fit between our index and the proxies used to measure informational asymmetry and we find four significant variables: coverage, volatility, Tobin q, and size.

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-fmk
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Published in European Financial Management Association (EFMA), University of Azores, Jun 2019, Ponta Delgada, Island of S. Miguel, Portugal

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