Deep Learning to Play Games

Daniele Condorelli and Massimiliano Furlan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We train two neural networks adversarially to play normal-form games. At each iteration, a row and column network take a new randomly generated game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated via stochastic gradient descent to minimize expected regret given the opponent's strategy. Our simulations demonstrate that the joint behavior of the networks converges to strategies close to Nash equilibria in almost all games. For all $2 \times 2$ and in 80% of $3 \times 3$ games with multiple equilibria, the networks select the risk-dominant equilibrium. Our results show how Nash equilibrium emerges from learning across heterogeneous games.

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-net
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