Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai and Clayton Thomas

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Abstract: We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We find that while many participants can (using a novel GUI) learn DA's mechanics and calculate its outcomes, such understanding does not imply understanding of strategyproofness (as measured by specially designed tests). However, a novel menu description of strategyproofness conveys this property significantly better than other treatments. While behavioral effects are small on average, participants with levels of strategyproofness understanding above a certain threshold play the classical dominant strategy at very high rates.

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mac
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