Uniform price auctions with pre-announced revenue targets: Evidence from China's SEOs

Shenghao Gao, Peyman Khezr and Armin Pourkhanali

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Abstract: This study explores the performance of auctions in China's seasoned equity offering (SEO) market, both theoretically and empirically. In these auctions, issuers must commit to a pre-announced revenue target and a maximum number of shares available for auction. We use a common value framework to analyze this auction mechanism, detailing its operation, share allocation, and pricing. The theoretical findings suggest that when buyers bid truthfully, the seller's optimal strategy is to set the total share quantity equal to the target revenue divided by the reserve price. We demonstrate that committing to a target revenue results in a higher level of truthful bidding compared to a standard uniform-price auction without any revenue commitment. We empirically test our theoretical findings using data from China's SEO markets. First, we assess the impact of various issuer strategies on firm-level SEO discounts, categorizing scenarios based on share availability and target revenue. We find that the scenario where the reserve price times the share quantity matches the target revenue is the most optimal for sellers. Second, we examine bidding behavior and auction performance, showing that China's SEO uniform price auction performs exceptionally well. Specifically, the actual issue prices are only 0.029 below the truthful case prices, indicating that the revenue raised is still close to what would have been achieved with truthful bids.

Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-des
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