Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication

Xiaoyu Cheng, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji and Ludovic Renou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment. Some experiments in the collection must be Pareto-ranked in that both players agree on their payoff ranking. If an optimal Bayesian persuasion experiment can be split in this way, then any not-too-ambiguity-averse sender as well as the receiver benefit. There are no benefits when the receiver has only two actions.

Date: 2024-10, Revised 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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