EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Counterfactual Analysis in Empirical Games

Brendan Kline and Elie Tamer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We address counterfactual analysis in empirical models of games with partially identified parameters, and multiple equilibria and/or randomized strategies, by constructing and analyzing the counterfactual predictive distribution set (CPDS). This framework accommodates various outcomes of interest, including behavioral and welfare outcomes. It allows a variety of changes to the environment to generate the counterfactual, including modifications of the utility functions, the distribution of utility determinants, the number of decision makers, and the solution concept. We use a Bayesian approach to summarize statistical uncertainty. We establish conditions under which the population CPDS is sharp from the point of view of identification. We also establish conditions under which the posterior CPDS is consistent if the posterior distribution for the underlying model parameter is consistent. Consequently, our results can be employed to conduct counterfactual analysis after a preliminary step of identifying and estimating the underlying model parameter based on the existing literature. Our consistency results involve the development of a new general theory for Bayesian consistency of posterior distributions for mappings of sets. Although we primarily focus on a model of a strategic game, our approach is applicable to other structural models with similar features.

Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.12731 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2410.12731

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2410.12731