Time evaluation of portfolio for asymmetrically informed traders

Bernardo D'Auria and Carlos Escudero

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Abstract: We study the anticipating version of the classical portfolio optimization problem in a financial market with the presence of a trader who possesses privileged information about the future (insider information), but who is also subjected to a delay in the information flow about the market conditions; hence this trader possesses an asymmetric information with respect to the traditional one. We analyze it via the Russo-Vallois forward stochastic integral, i. e. using anticipating stochastic calculus, along with a white noise approach. We explicitly compute the optimal portfolios that maximize the expected logarithmic utility assuming different classical financial models: Black-Scholes-Merton, Heston, Vasicek. Similar results hold for other well-known models, such as the Hull-White and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross ones. Our comparison between the performance of the traditional trader and the insider, although only asymmetrically informed, reveals that the privileged information overcompensates the delay in all cases, provided only one information flow is delayed. However, when two information flows are delayed, a competition between future information and delay magnitude enters into play, implying that the best performance depends on the parameter values. This, in turn, allows us to value future information in terms of time, and not only utility.

Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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