Evolution of Societies via Reinforcement Learning

Yann Bouteiller, Karthik Soma and Giovanni Beltrame

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The universe involves many independent co-learning agents as an ever-evolving part of our observed environment. Yet, in practice, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) applications are typically constrained to small, homogeneous populations and remain computationally intensive. We propose a methodology that enables simulating populations of Reinforcement Learning agents at evolutionary scale. More specifically, we derive a fast, parallelizable implementation of Policy Gradient (PG) and Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), tailored for evolutionary simulations where agents undergo random pairwise interactions in stateless normal-form games. We demonstrate our approach by simulating the evolution of very large populations made of heterogeneous co-learning agents, under both naive and advanced learning strategies. In our experiments, 200,000 PG or LOLA agents evolve in the classic games of Hawk-Dove, Stag-Hunt, and Rock-Paper-Scissors. Each game provides distinct insights into how populations evolve under both naive and advanced MARL rules, including compelling ways in which Opponent-Learning Awareness affects social evolution.

Date: 2024-10, Revised 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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