Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds Suffice

Hans Gersbach and Kremena Valkanova

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Abstract: This paper introduces Voting with Random Proposers (VRP) procedure to address the challenges of agenda manipulation in voting. In each round of VRP, a randomly selected proposer suggests an alternative that is voted on against the previous round's winner. In a framework with single-peaked preferences, we show that the VRP procedure guarantees that the Condorcet winner is implemented in a few rounds with truthful voting, and in just two rounds under sufficiently symmetric preference distributions or if status quo positions are not extreme. The results have applications for committee decisions, legislative decision-making, and the organization of citizens' assemblies and decentralized autonomous organizations.

Date: 2024-10, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-pol
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