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Economic Shocks, Opportunity Costs, and the Supply of Politicians

Laura Barros and Aiko Schmei{\ss}er

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Adverse economic shocks are known to reshape voter behavior -- the demand side of politics. Much less is known about their consequences for the supply side: how such shocks affect who becomes a politician. This paper examines how job losses influence individuals' decisions to enter politics and the implications for political selection. Using administrative data linking political participation records to matched employer-employee data covering all formal workers in Brazil, and exploiting mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, indicating that economic shocks can improve the quality of political entrants. The increase in candidacies is strongest among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from holding office and higher predicted income losses. A regression discontinuity design further shows that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases political entry. These results are consistent with a reduction in individuals' opportunity costs -- both in terms of reduced private-sector income and increased time resources -- facilitating greater political engagement.

Date: 2024-10, Revised 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab and nep-pol
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