The museum pass problem with consortia

Juan Carlos Gon\c{c}alves-Dosantos, Ricardo Mart\'inez and Joaqu\'in S\'anchez-Soriano

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Abstract: In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them.

Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2410.23923

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