Flexible Demand Manipulation

Yifan Dai and Andrew Koh

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a simple framework to analyze how targeted advertising interacts with market power. A designer chooses an advertising plan which allows it to flexibly manipulate the demand curve at some cost. A monopolist prices against this manipulated demand curve. We fully characterize the form and value of producer-optimal and consumer-optimal advertising plans under both ex-ante and ex-post measures of welfare. Flexibility is double-edged: producer-optimal plans substantially reduce consumer surplus vis-a-vis uniform advertising, but consumer-optimal plans can substantially improve consumer surplus. We discuss implications for the regulation of targeted advertising.

Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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