An algorithm for two-player repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

Jasmina Karabegovic

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) into a practical tool that balances theoretical accuracy with computational efficiency. The algorithm simplifies the complex task of identifying PPE payoff sets for any given discount factor {\delta}. A stand-alone implementation of the algorithm can be accessed at: https://github.com/jasmina-karabegovic/IRGames.git.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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