Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots

Wolfgang Kuhle

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. The model also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of traders who publish their information. Put differently, information aggregation works best if either no trader, or if every trader publishes his information. Small groups of distinguished experts are, on the contrary, an obstacle to information aggregation. The model's key assumption is that the perception/interpretation of a given piece of published information differs slightly across traders.

Date: 2024-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.01938 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2411.01938

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().