Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem

Adriana Amieva, Agustín Bonifacio and Pablo Neme

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Abstract: We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where public schools have priorities over teachers and teachers hold substitutable preferences over subsets of schools. We introduce a new concept of dynamic stability that recognizes the tenured positions of teachers and we prove that a dynamically stable matching always exists. We propose the Tenured-Respecting Deferred Acceptance $(TRDA)$ mechanism, which produces a dynamically stable matching that is constrained-efficient within the class of dynamically stable matchings and minimizes unjustified claims. To improve efficiency beyond this class, we also propose the Tenured-Respecting Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance $(TREADA)$ mechanism, an adaptation of the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism to our dynamic context. We demonstrate that the outcome of the $TREADA$ mechanism Pareto-dominates any dynamically stable matching and achieves efficiency when all teachers consent. Additionally, we examine the issue of manipulability, showing that although the $TRDA$ and $TREADA$ mechanisms can be manipulated, they remain non-obviously dynamically manipulable under specific conditions on schools' priorities.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ure
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