Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock

Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu and Yuxuan Zhu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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