A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions

Terence Highsmith

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design mechanisms satisfying fairness and limited strategy-proofness. They also avoid costly patience. Our empirically-based simulations suggest the mechanisms could increase adoptions by at least 25% versus the status quo. A naive dynamic extension of Deferred Acceptance does not attain these benefits. Our mechanisms sidestep direct preference elicitation by predicting preferences, and they are robust to prediction error.

Date: 2024-11, Revised 2025-08
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