Reinterpreting Delay and Procrastination

Conrad Kosowsky

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I model a rational agent who experiences endogenous deadline pressure in the face of a fixed future deadline. The agent holds a resource stock, and opportunities to spend resources arise randomly according to a Poisson process. When the deadline is far away, the agent smooths consumption, but as the deadline approaches, the agent prioritizes current spending because of uncertainty about the future. The combination of concave utility and the agent's liquidity induces correlation aversion. Connecting the agent's risk and time preference is intuitive and leads to a model of procrastination where the agent overestimates their desire to spend resources.

Date: 2024-11, Revised 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11828 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2411.11828

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().