Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments

Nadia Gui\~naz\'u, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

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Abstract: This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and commitments vary. Specifically, we analyze a dynamic matching game in which firms make offers to workers in each period, considering three types of commitment: (i) no commitment from either side, (ii) firms' commitment, and (iii) workers' commitment. Our results demonstrate that stable matchings can be supported as stationary equilibria under different commitment scenarios, depending on the strategies adopted by firms and workers. Furthermore, we identify key conditions, such as discount factors, that influence agents' decisions to switch partners, thereby shaping equilibrium outcomes.

Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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