Strategically Acting on Information

Xiaoming Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In many non-cooperative settings, agents often possess useful information that provide an advantage over their opponent(s), but acting on such information too frequently can lead to detection. I develop a simple framework to analyze such a trade-off and characterize the optimal way in which to act on information.

Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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