Quantifying Educational Competition: A Game-Theoretic Model with Policy Implications

Siyuan He

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The competitive pressures in China's primary and secondary education system have persisted despite decades of policy interventions aimed at reducing academic burdens and alleviating parental anxiety. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic interactions among families in this system, revealing how competition escalates into a socially irrational "education arms race." Through equilibrium analysis and simulations, the study demonstrates the inherent trade-offs between education equity and social welfare, alongside the policy failures arising from biased social cognition. The model is further extended using Spence's signaling framework to explore the inefficiencies of the current system and propose policy solutions that address these issues.

Date: 2024-12, Revised 2024-12
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