An Evaluation of Borda Count Variations Using Ranked Choice Voting Data

N. Bradley Fox and Benjamin Bruyns

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Abstract: The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We investigate alternative ranked choice voting systems using variations of the points-based Borda count which avoid monotonicity paradoxes. These variations are based on the way partial ballots are counted and on extending the values of the points assigned to each rank in the ballot. In particular, we demonstrate which voting failures are possible for each variation and then empirically study 421 U.S. ranked choice elections conducted from 2004 to 2023 to determine the frequency of voting failures when using five Borda variations. Our analysis demonstrates that the primary vulnerability of majority failures is rare or nonexistent depending on the variation. Other voting failures such as truncation or compromise failures occur more frequently compared to instant runoff voting as a trade-off for avoiding monotonicity paradoxes.

Date: 2024-12, Revised 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
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