Bundled School Choice

Lingbo Huang and Jun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper introduces a novel school choice system by incorporating school bundles into the standard framework. Schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within the bundle without ranking them. This approach addresses students' difficulty in forming precise preference rankings and expands the number of schools students can report on constrained preference lists, potentially enhancing their match likelihood and welfare. We develop a modified deferred acceptance mechanism that maintains stability while accommodating bundle reports. Laboratory experiments validate our theoretical findings, showing that well-designed bundles aligned with student preferences improve welfare and matching rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.

Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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