Bundled School Choice

Lingbo Huang and Jun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without ranking these schools. This approach helps students who struggle to rank schools precisely and expands options on limited preference lists, potentially improving match outcomes. We design a modified deferred acceptance mechanism to handle bundle reports while preserving stability. Laboratory experiments support our theory, showing that well-constructed bundles aligned with student preferences enhance welfare and match rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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