Making school choice lotteries transparent

Lingbo Huang and Jun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Lotteries are commonly employed in school choice to fairly resolve priority ties; however, current practices typically keep students uninformed about their lottery outcomes at the time of preference submission. This paper advocates for revealing lottery information to students beforehand. When preference lists are constrained in length, which is a common feature in real-world systems, such disclosure reduces uncertainty and enables students to make more informed decisions. We demonstrate the benefits of lottery revelation through two stylized models. Theoretical predictions are supported by laboratory experiments.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des, nep-exp and nep-ure
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