Entry deterrence by exploiting economies of scope in data aggregation

Luis Guijarro, Jos\'e-Ram\'on Vidal and Vicent Pla

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We model a market for data where an incumbent and a challenger compete for data from a producer. The incumbent has access to an exclusive data producer, and it uses this exclusive access, together with economies of scope in the aggregation of the data, as a strategy against the potential entry by the challenger. We assess the incumbent incentives to either deter or accommodate the entry of the challenger. We show that the incumbent will accommodate when the exclusive access is costly and when the economies of scope are low, and it will blockade or deter otherwise. The results would justify an access regulation that incentivizes the entry of the challenger, e.g., by increasing production costs for the exclusive data.

Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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