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Consistent Beliefs without Common Prior

Ziv Hellman and Mikl\'os Pint\'er

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every player is assigned positive probability. Morris (1991,1994) established an epistemological-behavioral duality characterisation of the common prior with full support, showing that a finite type space admits such a prior if and only if it contains no acceptable bet. This result forms the basis of the present paper. The paper makes three contributions: (1) The characterisation of Morris (1991,Morris1994) is extended to infinite type spaces. (2) The extension is robust: it does not depend on whether the infinite model applies countably additive or purely additive probabilities as beliefs. (3) The analysis implies that the notion of a real common prior-understood as a single probability distribution or a set of probability distributions-is not necessarily meaningful.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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