Checking Cheap Talk

Ian Ball and Xin Gao

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe) before choosing his action. We identify a class of influential equilibria in which the sender's message reveals which components of the state are highest, and the receiver selects one of these components to check. In these equilibria, the sender's message guides the receiver to check positively selected attributes. We provide conditions under which these equilibria are sender-optimal, Pareto efficient, or receiver-optimal among all equilibria.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.09875 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2501.09875

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().