Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, State-Salient Decision Rules and the Strict Condorcet Choice Function

Somdeb Lahiri

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic characterization of the Strict-Condorcet choice function on the domain of all preference profiles that have a strict-Condorcet winner, assuming that if the first two ranks are occupied by the same two alternatives in all states of nature, then the chosen alternative will be the one from these two that is preferred to the other with probability greater than half-provided such an alternative exists. We also show that this result is not valid if we extend the domain to the set of all preference profiles that have a unique weak-Condorcet winner.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.10986 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2501.10986

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().