Beyond Human Intervention: Algorithmic Collusion through Multi-Agent Learning Strategies

Suzie Grondin, Arthur Charpentier and Philipp Ratz

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Collusion in market pricing is a concept associated with human actions to raise market prices through artificially limited supply. Recently, the idea of algorithmic collusion was put forward, where the human action in the pricing process is replaced by automated agents. Although experiments have shown that collusive market equilibria can be reached through such techniques, without the need for human intervention, many of the techniques developed remain susceptible to exploitation by other players, making them difficult to implement in practice. In this article, we explore a situation where an agent has a multi-objective strategy, and not only learns to unilaterally exploit market dynamics originating from other algorithmic agents, but also learns to model the behaviour of other agents directly. Our results show how common critiques about the viability of algorithmic collusion in real-life settings can be overcome through the usage of slightly more complex algorithms.

Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-cmp and nep-com
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