Social choice with transfers

Gregorio Curello and Sam Jindani

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The question of interest is, given a set of possible alternatives, which should be chosen and what transfers, if any, should be made? We show that the Shapley value of the stand-alone game is the only solution to satisfy certain desirable properties.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.00308 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2502.00308

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().