A monotone solution to the problem of bargaining with transfers

Gregorio Curello and Sam Jindani

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We propose a solution to the problem of bargaining with transfers, along with an axiomatisation of the solution. Each player receives a weighted average of the claims of the coalitions to which she belongs minus a weighted average of the claims of the other coalitions, where a coalition's claim is determined by its best allocation in the bargaining set. The key axioms are additivity and a property we call allocation monotonicity, which states that increasing a player's payoff in an allocation of the bargaining set, either outright or by means of transfers from other players, must benefit that player.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.00308 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2502.00308

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().