Bargaining with transfers

Gregorio Curello and Sam Jindani

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Abstract: We propose and axiomatise a solution to the problem of bargaining when transfers between agents are possible. Each player receives a weighted sum of the claims of the coalitions to which she belongs minus a weighted sum of the claims of the other coalitions, where a coalition's claim is determined by its best allocation in the bargaining set. Our key axioms are additivity and a property we term allocation monotonicity, which concerns the effect of adding an allocation to the bargaining set.

Date: 2025-01, Revised 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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