The Market Design for Formulary Positions

Lawrence W. Abrams

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Abstract: The exchange of rebates for formulary positions is conceptualized as a multi-round combinatorial position auction. This paper develops a linear assignment model of the winners' determination equation of this auction where the bases are net unit prices after unit rebates and expected demand.

Date: 2025-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2502.00970

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